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Introduction
Costa Rica is among the strongest supporters of the Responsibility to 
Protect (RtoP) doctrine and has been a leader in the development and 
implementation of this principle to date, always with an emphasis on 
prevention. Costa Rica also performed an integral role in catalyzing 
negotiations for and securing the eventual adoption of the Arms Trade 
Treaty (ATT), which establishes common international standards for 
the international trade of all conventional arms. 
The unchecked proliferation of conventional arms not only provides 
the tools with which atrocities may be carried out, but also fuels po-
litical and socio-economic conditions that increase the risk that such 
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 violence may occur. Therefore, without effective regulation of the 
international trade in conventional arms, the ability of States to fulfill 
their responsibility to protect is fundamentally undermined. In this 
way, the ATT can play an important role in helping the international 
community to operationalize RtoP.
Part II of this article provides a brief summary of the development and 
legal foundations of RtoP. Part III discusses key elements of Costa Rica’s 
approach to the responsibility to protect as an international legal norm 
and what steps it has taken to operationalize RtoP. Part IV discusses 
Costa Rica’s prominent role in the negotiation and adoption of the 
ATT and highlights important complementarities between the ATT 
and RtoP. Part V concludes by advocating that in addition to conti-
nuing to promote RtoP at the United Nations level as well as through 
national and transnational initiatives, Costa Rica should advocate for 
the universal adoption and implementation of the ATT as an essential 
tool for preventing the commission of atrocity crimes.
Background and Legal Basis of the Responsibility to 
Protect  
The responsibility to protect (RtoP) is an emerging norm of interna-
tional law. It received formal recognition in the 2005 World Summit 
Outcome Document, adopted by the United Nations General Assem-
bly in its Resolution 60/1 of 2005, which provides in relevant part that:
138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the pre-
vention of such crimes, including their incitement, through 
appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility 
and will act in accordance with it. The international community 
should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this 
responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing 
an early warning capability.
139. The international community, through the United Na-
tions, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, 
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humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with 
Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect popula-
tions from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take 
collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the 
Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including 
Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with 
relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peace-
ful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly 
fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the 
need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of 
the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its 
implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter 
and international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as 
necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to 
protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those 
which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out.2
In 2009, the General Assembly resolved to continue its consideration 
of RtoP, despite the reservations expressed by some states—namely 
Venezuela, Iran, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Cuba, Syria and Sudan.3
Since 2009, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon (“the Secretary 
General”) has presented several reports to facilitate Member States’ 
continued consideration of RtoP. Although these reports are not 
themselves binding, they provide useful guidelines for Member States 
in understanding and applying RtoP as an international norm. The 
“Report of the Secretary General – Implementing the Responsibility 
to Protect,” issued in 2009, sets forth the three interrelated pillars that 
have come to define subsequent analysis and development of the RtoP 
doctrine, namely the protection responsibilities of the State (“Pillar 
I”), the commitment of the international community to provide inter-
national assistance and capacity-building to assist States in fulfilling 
their protection responsibilities (“Pillar II”), and the responsibility of 
the international community to take timely and decisive action when 
States manifestly fail to meet their responsibilities (“Pillar III”).4
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Subsequent reports have shed additional light on these three pillars. 
In 2010, the Secretary General presented a second report, “Early war-
ning, assessment and the responsibility to protect,” which focused on 
the need for early warning and assessment capacities to facilitate the 
implementation of RtoP.5 In 2011, the Secretary General reported on 
“The role of regional and sub-regional arrangements in implementing 
the responsibility to protect,” which focused on the role of regional 
and sub-regional organizations in operationalizing all three pillars and 
explored opportunities for collaboration.6 The Secretary General’s 2012 
Report, “Responsibility to Protect – Timely and Decisive Response,” 
discussed how international, regional, national and local actors can 
respond to threats or occurrences of atrocities in a timely and decisi-
ve manner.7 The 2013 Report on “State Responsibility and Prevention” 
examines risk factors that have been identified in situations where 
atrocities have been committed in the past, and provides examples of 
preventive measures drawn from the experiences of Member States.8
In spite of its infancy, RtoP is gaining traction in international law. 
Indeed, the UN Security Council has reaffirmed the doctrine in a num-
ber of binding resolutions. For example, Resolutions 1674 and 1894 
on protection of civilians in armed conflict “[r]eaffirm[]the relevant 
provisions of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document regarding 
the protection of civilians in armed conflict, including paragraphs 138 
and 139 thereof regarding the responsibility to protect populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”9 
Resolutions on situations of concern with respect to protection of civi-
lians in specific countries have also reaffirmed RtoP, such as Resolution 
2063 on the situation in Sudan,10 Resolution 2009 regarding Libya,11 
and Resolutions 2069 and 2120 regarding Afghanistan,12 among others. 
Also of particular significance is Resolution 2117on small arms and 
light weapons, which highlights a specific link between RtoP and the 
misuse of small arms and light weapons to commit atrocity crimes.13
These reaffirmations at the Security Council level point to the streng-
thening of RtoP as an emerging norm of international law. Nevertheless, 
Member States continue to debate the legal and political status of 
RtoP.14 One thing, however, is clear: the substantive content of RtoP 
and how it should function in practice, are still in flux. Costa Rica has 
and should continue to voice its vision of a robust interpretation of 
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RtoP, not merely as an abstract point of legal doctrine but rather as a 
guiding operational principle for its efforts at the national, regional, 
and multilateral levels. 
Costa Rica and the Responsibility to Protect
Costa Rica has strongly affirmed the legitimacy of RtoP, which it 
understands to flow from the fundamental responsibility of States to 
protect their citizens.15Moreover, it interprets RtoP as being, to draw 
from the words of the Secretary General, “narrow but deep.”16 Narrow 
in that its legal scope is limited to instances of genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity only; deep in that it goes 
to the very core of sovereignty. These limitations notwithstanding and 
in accordance with its long-standing commitments to human rights, 
humanitarian law, and disarmament, Costa Rica has been amongst the 
strongest supporters of the RtoP doctrine. It is important to recognize, 
however, that Costa Rica does not understand RtoP to amount to a 
carte blanche for humanitarian intervention. Rather, consistent with 
the language of Resolution 60/1, collective action under RtoP must 
adhere to the parameters set forth in the UN Charter.17
Costa Rica understands RtoP to be first and foremost a doctrine of 
prevention. As articulated by former Director General of Foreign Policy, 
Danilo González, in his capacity as Costa Rica’s RtoP Focal Point,
[t]he best way to prevent mass atrocities and large scale 
humanitarian crises, is to prevent conflict…investment in 
democracy, strengthening the rule of law, and promoting the 
protection of human rights in a context of human develop-
ment, remain the best way to avoid social tensions and the 
signs of intolerance that are often cited as causes of those 
conflicts that have erupted into the gravest humanitarian 
crises of our times.18
This focus on prevention—on eradicating the seeds of conflict before 
they take root—is consistent with Costa Rica’s unflagging commitment 
to promoting peace, democracy and human dignity, both domestically 
and in the international arena. Costa Rica has demonstrated its com-
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mitment to RtoP through its actions within the sphere of the United 
Nations, as well as through national initiatives and participation in 
transnational networks dedicated to the promotion and application 
of RtoP. 
Promotion of RtoP within the United Nations 
Costa Rica supported both General Assembly Resolutions on the 
subject of RtoP: Resolution 60/1 containing the Outcome Document 
of the 2005 World Summit,19 and Resolution 63/308,20 by which the 
General Assembly resolved to continue its consideration of RtoP. 
Moreover, Costa Rica has been an active participant in the ongoing 
General Assembly Interactive Dialogue on RtoP.21 Costa Rica voiced a 
particularly progressive stance with respect to the 2005 World Summit 
Outcome Document, voicing its faith in the Security Council as “the 
only legitimate mechanism for confronting threats to peace,” while 
advocating for significant reforms to the Security Council, including 
an expansion of the number of non-permanent numbers and an eli-
mination of the veto right in matters of genocide, war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, and massive violations of human rights.22
Indeed, recent events in Syria highlight the extent to which current 
Security Council structures may impede the kind of “timely” and 
“decisive” action that Pillar III of RtoP calls for.23 As evidenced by 
the Syria situation, further analysis of how to facilitate robust appli-
cation of Pillar III within the parameters of the UN Charter is needed. 
Although its suggested reforms to the Security Council were not 
ultimately reflected in the Outcome Document, they are indicative 
of Costa Rica’s active role in promoting a strong application of RtoP, 
even from its earliest stages. Costa Rica should continue to contribute 
to this dialogue. 
Costa Rica also advocated for the development and application of 
RtoP during its recent term as a member of the Security Council, from 
2008 to 2009. For example, Costa Rica requested that the Security 
Council consider humanitarian intervention in Myanmar, in response 
to evidence of massive human rights violations and an increasingly dire 
humanitarian situation.24 Although the Security Council elected not 
to take such action, Costa Rica’s proposed response to circumstances 
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in Myanmar offers a useful example of how Pillar III can be put into 
practice in a way that is consistent with the UN Charter and the 
primacy of the UN Security Council in authorizing the use of force. 
During its 2008-2009 Security Council term, Costa Rica was also 
a vocal advocate of the International Criminal Court (ICC). The 
ICC is a key tool for operationalizing RtoP because it provides an 
alternative to impunity or ad hoc prosecution arrangements for those 
found to have committed atrocity crimes.25 In particular, Costa Rica 
expressed concern with what it perceived to be insufficient action 
by the Security Council to ensure the Sudanese government’s com-
pliance with Security Council Resolution 1593 of 2005, referring the 
situation in Darfur, Sudan to the Prosecutor of the ICC.26 Costa Rica 
also expressed support for the warrant issued in 2009 for the arrest of 
Sudanese President, Omar Al-Bashir.27 As a result of this firm stance, 
the Security Council approved a Presidential Declaration in June of 
2009, demanding that Sudan turn over to the ICC two Sudanese 
accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity: Ahmad Harun, 
Former Minister of the Interior, and Ali Kushayb, alleged leader of 
the Janjaweed Militias.28
Costa Rica’s support for the ICC goes beyond its participation in the 
Security Council, particularly through its role in the Group of Friends 
of the International Criminal Court.29 In that capacity, Costa Rica 
has focused on strengthening the relationship between international 
criminal law and human rights, attributing to the ICC an integral 
role in enforcing international human rights law where violations of 
those rights constitute crimes against humanity, war crimes and/or 
genocide.30
By taking a decisive stance in support of RtoP in the General Assem-
bly and during its recent tenure on the Security Council, as well as 
through continued support of international institutions critical to the 
implementation of RtoP such as the ICC, Costa Rica has demonstrated 
its commitment to the responsibility to protect not only in word, but 
also in deed. Costa Rica continues to implement this commitment 
beyond the UN context through its pioneering efforts at the national 
and transnational levels. 
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Transnational Cooperation 
Costa Rica participates in a number of transnational networks dedica-
ted to the promotion of RtoP through intergovernmental coordination 
as well as collaboration between governments and nongovernmental 
actors, including the RtoP Focal Points Initiative and the Latin Ame-
rican Network for Genocide and Mass Atrocity Prevention. Both of 
these innovative initiatives were highlighted in the Secretary General’s 
2013 Report.31
Costa Rica is one of four co-organizer States for the RtoP Focal Points 
Initiative, along with Australia, Denmark and Ghana.32Launched in 
2010 by the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect in asso-
ciation with the governments of Denmark and Ghana, the RtoP Focal 
Points Initiative seeks to encourage UN Member States to designate 
senior officials (“Focal Points”) responsible for improving atrocity 
crimes prevention and response efforts at the national level, as well 
as to facilitate international coordination and cooperation by linking 
those focal points to form a global network.33 The Secretary General’s 
2013 Report specifically noted that 28 States had appointed RtoP 
Focal Points as of July 2013 and encouraged other States to consider 
similar measures.34
To date, there have been three meetings of RtoP Focal Points, focu-
sing on issues such as what role the Focal Point can and should play, 
discussing experiences of promoting RtoP at the domestic level, and 
identifying challenges to the effective implementation of R2toP.35 Fur-
thermore, the first regional meeting of RtoP Focal Points, for Europe, 
was held in Slovenia in 2013, where the issues discussed included how 
to enhance cooperation on RtoP, such as through regional bodies such 
as the European Union (EU), the Organization for Security and Coope-
ration in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe, what additional 
improvements are needed to strengthen capacities for atrocity crimes 
prevention, and the importance of consensus-building among States 
as to the content and operationalization of RtoP.36
Along the same lines, Latin American States can build on their le-
gacy of intergovernmental coordination through organizations like 
the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, as well as sub-regional bodies such 
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as the Andean Community (CAN) and the Union of South American 
Nations (UNASUR), to pursue opportunities for regional coordination 
in clarifying and strengthening the role of RtoP Focal Points in those 
States where they have already been appointed, and encouraging de-
signation of RtoP Focal Points in States where one has not yet been 
put in place. 
The role of the RtoP Focal Point encompasses both internal and ex-
ternal dimensions.37 At the domestic level,the main responsibilities 
are advocacy and socialization, institutionalization (such as training 
and capacity-building for relevant actors such as police and military 
forces), mass atrocity strategic planning and advice, and early warning 
and response coordination.38 Focal points also engage externally, com-
municating and coordinating with one another through networks.39
This dual approach facilitates the effective application of RtoP in 
two key ways. First, because implementing RtoP at the national level 
necessarily implies a wide range of actors, including different organs 
of government as well as civil society organizations and the private 
sector, the focal point acts as a “proactive ‘hub’ for analysis, policy 
input, and intergovernmental coordination,”40 as well as promoting 
accountability at the national level. Second, coordination among focal 
points facilitates early warning communications as well as opportunities 
for the exchange of experiences and best practices. 
The Latin American Network for Genocide and Mass Atrocity Preven-
tion, another transnational venture dedicated to promoting RtoP, was 
formed in 2012 by the governments of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa 
Rica, Ecuador, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay in collaboration 
with the Auschwitz Institute for Peace and Reconciliation (AIPR) 
and with the support of the Office of the Special Advisor of the UN 
Secretary General on Genocide Prevention (OSAPG).41 Network mem-
bership has since grown to 18 countries, with the addition of Bolivia, 
Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, the Dominican Republic, 
Honduras and Venezuela.42
The primary function of the Latin American Network for Genocide and 
Mass Atrocity Prevention is education, using seminars administered at 
sites of past genocide and mass atrocities to train first policy-makers 
and eventually future instructors, in order to institutionalize atrocity 
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crimes prevention training programs at the national level.43 The Net-
work also encourages its members to strengthen genocide prevention 
initiatives in their national government structures or to develop such 
programs where none exist, and aims to facilitate annual meetings to 
promote intergovernmental collaboration and information exchange.44
These innovative inter-governmental and inter-sectorial collaborations 
are important steps toward the operationalization of the preventive 
dimensions of RtoP. Costa Rica and other regional leaders should 
continue to support their development and encourage the expansion 
of their membership. 
National Implementation 
Of course, transnational cooperation is meant to enhance, rather than 
to substitute for, domestic efforts to prevent atrocity crimes. For its 
part, Costa Rica has engaged in a variety of actions at the national 
level including, notably, the formation of the Costa Rican Commis-
sion on International Humanitarian Law and the Inter-Institutional 
Commission on Human Rights. 
The Costa Rican Commission on International Humanitarian Law 
(CCDIH), formed in 2004, operates under the auspices of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and is comprised of 16 members: 11 government 
agencies, 2 universities, the National Council of Rectors, the Bar Asso-
ciation, and the Red Cross of Costa Rica.45 The Commission advises the 
Executive branch with regards to the adoption, application and disse-
mination of international humanitarian law. Among the Commission’s 
most notable accomplishments is its role in making Costa Rica the first 
Latin American country to be a State Party to all international treaties 
on or related to international humanitarian law as of 2012.46 The Com-
mission also trains functionaries of relevant government agencies, such 
as the Congress and police forces, in international humanitarian law. 
The Inter-Institutional Commission for the Oversight and Implemen-
tation of International Human Rights Obligations, also overseen by 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was formed in 2011. This Commission 
is made up of twenty government agencies as well as a permanent 
consultative mechanism to facilitate direct civil society participation.47 
Luis Alberto Cordero and Kirsten A. Harmon
155
PE
N
SA
M
IE
N
TO
 P
RO
PI
O
 4
1
The Commission’s main function is to ensure Costa Rica’s compliance 
with its various human rights surveillance and reporting obligations 
under applicable international instruments. 
These steps to operationalize international humanitarian law and 
international human rights law at the national level form the core 
of Costa Rica’s current strategy for implementing its responsibilities 
under RtoP and provide useful examples for other UN Member Sta-
tes to consider. However, although Costa Rica’s efforts to date are no 
doubt laudable, it is clear that additional tools are needed in order to 
effectively prevent and respond to atrocities. 
Strengthening the RtoP Toolkit: The Arms Trade Treaty 
The availability of conventional arms, particularly small arms and 
light weapons, is a significant risk factor for the commission of atro-
city crimes. This relationship is highlighted in UN Security Council 
Resolution 2117,48 as discussed above, as well as in the Secretary 
General’s 200949 and 201350 Reports and the Genocide Analysis Fra-
mework promulgated by the Office of the UN Special Adviser on the 
Prevention of Genocide (OSAPG), which identifies the presence of 
illegal arms and armed elements, indicative of the “capacity to commit 
genocide,” as one of eight factors used to determine whether there 
is a risk of genocide in a given situation.51 In addition to the integral 
role of arms as the literal instruments by which atrocity crimes may 
be committed, the unregulated flow of weapons may itself be a trigger 
for these crimes, insofar as it can aggravate underlying conditions of 
instability and conflict, such as ineffective institutions, inequality, and 
the marginalization of certain social groups, that have been shown to 
contribute to the outbreak of atrocities.52
One conclusion to be drawn from this is that effective arms control 
mechanisms are essential to the successful application of RtoP. As 
such, support is growing around the Arms Trade Treaty (“ATT”), which 
establishes universal regulations for the international trade of all con-
ventional arms and their ammunition. U.S. Permanent Representative 
to the United Nations, Samantha Power, recently highlighted the ATT 
as an example of “multilateraliz[ing]” efforts to prevent atrocities, 
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putting RtoP into practice by “help[ing] to prevent the illicit flow of 
arms to atrocity perpetrators.”53 Shortly thereafter, the Security Council 
passed Resolution 2117, which not only reaffirmed RtoP and clarified 
its connection to small arms and light weapons, but even went so far 
as “[u]rg[ing] States to consider signing and ratifying the Arms Trade 
Treaty as soon as possible and encourag[ing] States, intergovernmental, 
regional and sub-regional organizations that are in a position to do so 
to render assistance in capacity-building to enable States Parties to 
fulfil [sic] and implement the Treaty’s obligations.”54
The ATT can help prevent atrocity crimes both directly, by keeping 
weapons out of the hands of those who would commit them, and indi-
rectly by reducing the extent to which the now under-regulated trade 
in conventional arms fuels conditions that present risk factors for the 
commission of atrocity crimes. Thus, the ATT should be at the core 
of future efforts to operationalize RtoP. Costa Rica, which has been 
at the vanguard of the international community in promoting both 
RtoP and the ATT, is poised to lead this endeavor. 
The Arms Trade Treaty and Costa Rica’s Role 
After some seven years of intensive negotiations, the UN General As-
sembly adopted the Arms Trade Treaty (“ATT”) on April 2, 2013, by 
a vote of 154 in favor, with only 3 votes against (Iran, the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea, and Syria), and 23 abstentions.55 To date, 
115 States have signed the treaty and 9 have ratified it.56 Momentum 
for this landmark treaty can be traced at least as far back as 1997, when 
a group of Nobel Laureates led by former Costa Rican President Dr. 
Óscar Arias Sánchez proposed an International Code of Conduct on 
Arms Transfers.57 Costa Rica, one of the “Co-Author” Countries that 
first proposed the ATT to the General Assembly in 2006, remained 
one of the treaty’s strongest advocates throughout the negotiation 
process and was among the first countries to sign it on June 3, 2013. On 
September 3, 2013, Costa Rica became the third country to ratify the 
ATT,58 due in large part to the steadfast support and commitment of the 
administration of Costa Rican President, Laura Chinchilla Miranda.
The objectives of the ATT are to “[e]stablish the highest possible com-
mon international standards for regulating or improving the regulation 
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of the international trade in conventional arms” and to “[p]revent 
and eradicate the illicit trade in conventional arms and prevent their 
diversion.”59 These objectives serve a threefold purpose: to contribute 
to international and regional peace, security and stability; to reduce 
human suffering; and to “[p]romot[e] cooperation, transparency and 
responsible action by States Parties in the international trade in con-
ventional arms, thereby building confidence among States Parties.”60
The ATT operates by establishing a set of criteria that States Parties 
must apply to all transfers of conventional arms, ammunition, parts and 
components that come within the treaty’s scope.61 The conventional 
arms covered fall into seven main categories: battle tanks, armored 
combat vehicles, large-caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack 
helicopters, warships, missiles and missile launchers, and small arms 
and light weapons.62 The criteria to be applied to the decision of 
whether or not to authorize a transfer can be divided into two main 
categories: prohibitions and export assessments. 
First, all States Parties are prohibited from authorizing a transfer of 
conventional arms (“prohibitions”)where the transfer would (1) vio-
late the State’s obligations under measures adopted by the Security 
Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, (2) violate 
relevant international obligations under international agreements to 
which the State is party, particularly arms control agreements, and (3) 
if the State “has knowledge that the arms or items would be used in 
the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity, grave breaches 
of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, attacks directed against civilian 
objects or civilians protected as such, or other war crimes as defined 
by international agreements to which it is party.”63
The second set of criteria apply only to arms-exporting States (“export 
assessments”), obliging those States to conduct a risk assessment and, 
where there is an overriding risk that certain negative consequences 
would result from the export despite any efforts to mitigate the risk 
in question, decline to export. These negative consequences include 
that the arms will be used to: 
(i) commit or facilitate a serious violation of international 
humanitarian law; (ii) commit or facilitate a serious violation 
of international human rights law; (iii) commit or facilitate an 
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act constituting an offence under international conventions or 
protocols relating to terrorism to which the exporting State is a 
Party; or (iv) commit or facilitate an act constituting an offence 
under international conventions or protocols related to transna-
tional organized crime to which the exporting State is a Party.64
The treaty also confers responsibilities upon arms-importing States, 
to provide adequate and relevant information to exporting States to 
facilitate accurate export assessments,65 and requires all State Parties to 
take measures, where appropriate and feasible, to regulate the transit 
and transshipment of conventional arms through their territory.66 All 
States Parties must also take steps to prevent the diversion of conven-
tional arms to anyone other than their authorized end user, and must 
comply with recordkeeping and reporting requirements.67
The Arms Trade Treaty and RtoP
As discussed above, the ATT can serve the objectives of RtoP both 
directly and indirectly. Directly, in that the ATT expressly prohibits 
the transfer of arms not only where the State Party has knowledge 
that they will be used to commit atrocity crimes, but also where the 
transfer would violate Security Council decisions, particularly arms 
embargoes and other steps that may be taken under Pillar III of 
RtoP in response to a State’s manifest failure to protect its people 
from atrocity crimes. Thus, the ATT would provide crucial support 
for a collective response taken under Pillar III, whether through the 
use of force or otherwise, by making all States subject to the same 
set of standards with respect to international arms transfers and 
thereby prohibiting certain States from circumventing attempts by 
the Security Council or other international bodies to prevent or halt 
atrocity crimes through arms embargoes or other coordinated actions. 
Recent events in Syria, where Russia has continued to supply arms 
to President Bashar al-Assad even as the civilian death toll continues 
to mount,68 exemplify how an ATT that holds all States to the same 
set of prohibition and risk assessment standards for all international 
transfers of conventional weapons, could dramatically change the 
course of events in a situation where atrocity crimes have been or 
are at risk of being committed.
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Furthermore, the insufficient regulation of conventional arms trans-
fers that the ATT seeks to address, contributes significantly to factors 
of social, political and economic instability that place societies at 
increased risk of atrocity crimes taking place. The Secretary General’s 
2013 Report identifies a number of key factors influencing the risk 
of atrocity crimes, which preventive efforts should seek to address, 
including  history of discrimination or other human rights violations 
against members of a particular group or population; an underlying 
motivation – often political, economic, military or religious – for 
targeting a particular community; the presence of armed groups 
or militia and their capacity to commit atrocity crimes, including 
the proliferation of arms; the existence of particular circumstances 
that facilitate the perpetration of such crimes; the incapacity of the 
government to prevent the crimes or the absence of structures and 
institutions designed to protect the population; and the commission 
of acts that could be elements of genocide, war crimes, or crimes 
against humanity as defined by the Rome Statute of the ICC.69
It is now widely accepted that there is “a strong association between 
higher levels of armed violence and fragile institutional capacities,” 
as well as “a strong association between insecurity and underdeve-
lopment.”70 In other words, armed violence is both a cause and a 
consequence of institutional instability and underdevelopment, both 
of which can contribute to the risk of atrocity crimes. 
The 2011 Global Burden of Armed Violence Report demonstrates 
the close and mutually reinforcing relationship between armed vio-
lence, defined as “the use or threatened use of arms to inflict injury 
or death,”71 and key development indicators. For example, higher 
incidence of armed violence is correlated with higher adolescent birth 
rates, higher child and infant mortality rates, higher percentage of 
persons living with HIV between the ages of 15-49, lower share of 
national income or consumption held by the poorest quintile of the 
population, higher population living off of less than USD $1 per day, 
lower human development indices, and higher unemployment rates 
for both men and women between the ages of 15-24.72
Coupled with the ready availability of conventional arms, particu-
larly small arms and light weapons whose authorized transfers alone 
amounted to at least USD $8.5 billion between 2009 and 2011, not to 
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mention their vast illicit trade,73 such manifestations of socioecono-
mic instability provide fertile ground for atrocity crimes. Paired with 
underdeveloped or ineffective political institutions, the combination 
becomes even more combustible.
Thus, bringing the global trade in conventional arms under control 
is essential if RtoP is to be operationalized effectively. The ATT has 
the capacity to make a significant impact in that regard. However, the 
treaty’s adoption and growing number of signatures are but the first 
steps in a much longer journey. The ATT will not even enter into force 
until fifty UN Member States have ratified it.74Then, once the treaty 
enters into force, each State Party must take the necessary measures 
to implement its obligations under the treaty, which in some cases 
will involve significant reforms at the national level that a State may 
or may not have the financial and technical resources to undertake. 
Moreover, anything less than universal accession and implementation 
will undermine the treaty’s effectiveness, insofar as non-parties may 
continue to act as loopholes through which irresponsible arms transfers 
can pass unchecked. 
Therefore, Costa Rica’s work as a champion of the ATT is far from 
over: indeed, it is just beginning. In its continued efforts to promote 
the universalization and effective implementation of the ATT, Costa 
Rica should highlight the significance of these actions not only for 
their own sake but also as consistent with RtoP. 
Conclusion 
The development of a responsibility to protect in international law is 
an ongoing process. While the base of support for the RtoP doctrine 
continues to broaden among States, its legal contents and effect remain 
uncertain. Even for advocates of RtoP, the form that this emerging 
norm will ultimately take remains to be seen.
Opponents of the RtoP doctrine have framed it as creating a right to ad 
hoc intervention and, as such, presenting a threat to state sovereignty. 
This mischaracterizes RtoP in two key ways. First, RtoP is not, at its 
core, a new right or obligation: it is merely an expression of the inherent 
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responsibilities that accompany the right of sovereignty. Second, this 
responsibility is not a threat, but rather, as articulated in the Secretary 
General’s 2012 Report, “an ally of sovereignty, in that collective action 
by the international community to protect populations is not called for 
where a State fully discharges its sovereign responsibility to protect.”75 
In other words, the best way for Member States to guard against outside 
intervention is to fulfill their fundamental responsibility to their own 
people by protecting them from atrocity crimes. 
Costa Rica, a strong supporter of RtoP from its inception, has interpre-
ted RtoP as a doctrine rooted in prevention and has taken significant 
steps to implement that understanding, as discussed in this article. 
However, it is important to recognize that a strong RtoP framework 
cannot be built on a foundation that is continually eroded by the 
ceaseless flow of arms and ammunition to vulnerable regions around 
world. Thus, to effectively operationalize RtoP, this tide simply must 
be stemmed. In this way, the recently adopted Arms Trade Treaty, or 
ATT, offers an important complement to RtoP.  
To be sure, the ATT is no panacea for atrocity crimes. Indeed, the ATT 
has attracted its own set of detractors, echoing many of the same con-
cerns with respect to infringement of sovereignty that have been voiced 
with regard to RtoP. Even States that support RtoP, the ATT, or both, 
may view the prospect of a linkage between RtoP and the ATT with some 
skepticism, particularly to the extent that such a linkage may provide 
additional ammunition for those States that oppose one or the other as 
an unacceptable infringement of their sovereignty. This is a legitimate 
concern in principle. However, highlighting the extent to which these 
two sets of international legal obligations can complement one another 
in their application does not imply expansion of the scope of the legal 
obligations set forth under either. To take advantage of the potential 
for synergies need not change the nature of the legal norms themselves. 
Effective regulation of conventional weapons transfers is essential if 
States are to succeed in protecting their citizens from atrocity crimes 
and the conditions that foment them. The alternative, as former Costa 
Rican President and Nobel Peace Laureate Oscar Arias aptly stated in 
his 2006 General Assembly Address, is to be “condemned to walk to 
the edge of the cliff, to live in the wheel of eternal return, like Sisyphus 
with each summit reached only to walk the path over again.”76If we are 
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to succeed in putting RtoP into practice for the good of the world’s 
people we must commit ourselves to breaking this cycle, and the ATT 
is a vital tool in that struggle. As the first Latin American country to 
ratify the ATT and one of its most vocal champions from the outset, 
Costa Rica can and should lead this charge. 
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